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The financial market turmoil in 2007 and 2008 has led to the most severe financial crisis 
since the Great Depression and threatens to have large repercussions on the real economy. The 
bursting of the housing bubble forced banks to write down several hundred billion dollars in bad 
loans caused by mortgage delinquencies.  At the same time, the stock market capitalization of the 
major banks declined by more than twice as much. While the overall mortgage losses are large on 
an absolute scale, they are still relatively modest compared to the $8 trillion of U.S. stock market 
wealth lost between October 2007, when the stock market reached an all-time high, and October 
2008. This paper attempts to explain the economic mechanisms that caused losses in the mortgage 
market to amplify into such large dislocations and turmoil in the financial markets, and describes 
common economic threads that explain the plethora of market declines, liquidity dry-ups, defaults 
and bailouts that occurred after the crisis broke in summer 2007.  
To understand these threads, it is useful to recall some key factors leading up to the housing 
bubble. The U.S. economy was experiencing a low interest-rate environment, both because of large 
capital inflows from abroad, especially from Asian countries, and because the Federal Reserve had 
adopted a lax interest rate policy. Asian countries bought U.S. securities both to peg the exchange 
rates on an export-friendly level and to hedge against a depreciation of their own currency against 
the dollar, a lesson learned from South-East Asia crisis in the late 1990s. The Federal Reserve Bank 
feared a deflationary period after the bursting of the Internet bubble and thus did not counteract the 
buildup  of  the  housing  bubble.  At  the  same  time,  the  banking  system  underwent  an  important 
transformation. The traditional banking model, in which the issuing banks hold loans until they are 
repaid, was replaced by the ―originate and distribute‖ banking model, in which loans are pooled, 
tranched  and  then  resold  via  securitization.  The  creation  of  new  securities  facilitated  the  large 
capital inflows from abroad. The first part of the paper describes this trend towards the ―originate 
and  distribute‖  model  and  how  it  ultimately  led  to  a  decline  in  lending  standards.  Financial 
innovation that had supposedly made the banking system more stable by transferring risk to those 
most able to bear it led to an unprecedented credit expansion that helped feed the boom in housing 
prices.  
The second part of the paper provides an event logbook of the financial market turmoil in 
2007-08, ending with the start of the coordinated international bailout in October 2008. The third 
part explores four economic mechanisms through which the mortgage crisis amplified into a severe   3 
financial crisis: 1) Borrowers’ balance sheet effects cause two ―liquidity spirals.‖ When asset prices 
drop financial institutions‘ capital erodes and, at the same time, lending standards and margins 
tighten. Both effects cause fire-sales, pushing down prices and tightening funding even further. 2) 
The Lending channel can dry up when banks become concerned about their future access to capital 
markets and start hoarding funds (even if the creditworthiness of borrowers does not change). 3) 
Runs  on  financial  institutions,  like  those  that  occurred  at  Bear  Stearns,  Lehman  Brothers,  and 
Washington Mutual, can cause a sudden erosion of bank capital. 4) Network effects can arise when 
financial institutions are lenders and borrowers at the same time. In particular, a gridlock can occur 
in which multiple trading parties fail to cancel out offsetting positions because of concerns about 
counterparty credit risk. To protect themselves against the risks that are not netted out, each party 
has to hold additional funds.  
 
Banking Industry Trends Leading Up to the Liquidity Squeeze 
 
Two  trends  in  the  banking  industry  contributed  significantly  to  the  lending  boom  and 
housing frenzy that laid the foundations for the crisis. First, instead of holding loans on banks‘ 
balance sheets, banks moved to an ―originate and distribute‖ model. Banks repackaged loans and 
passed  them  on  to  various  other  financial  investors,  thereby  off-loading  risk.  Second,  banks 
increasingly financed their asset holdings with shorter maturity instruments. This change left banks 
particularly exposed to a dry-up in funding liquidity.  
 
Securitization: Credit Protection, Pooling, and Tranching Risk 
To  offload  risk,  banks  typically  create  ―structured‖  products  often  referred  to  as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The first step is to form diversified portfolios of mortgages 
and other types of loans, corporate bonds, and other assets like credit card receivables. The next step 
is to slice these portfolios into different tranches. These tranches are then sold to investor groups 
with different appetites for risk. The safest tranche—known as the ―super senior tranche‖—offers 
investors a (relatively) low interest rate, but it is the first to be paid out of the cash flows of the 
portfolio.  In  contrast,  the  most  junior  tranche—referred  to  as  the  ―equity  tranche‖  or  ―toxic 
waste‖—will be paid only after all other tranches have been paid. The mezzanine tranches are 
between these extremes. Legally, the portfolio is usually transferred to a ―special purpose vehicle,‖   4 
a  financial  entity  whose  sole  purpose  is  to  collect  principal  and  interest  cash  flows  from  the 
underlying assets and pass them on to the owners of the various tranches. 
  The exact cutoffs between the tranches are typically chosen to ensure a specific rating for 
each tranche. For example, the top tranches are constructed to receive a AAA rating. The more 
senior tranches are then sold to various investors, while the toxic waste is usually (but not always) 
held by the issuing bank, to ensure that it adequately monitors the loans.   
Buyers of these tranches or regular bonds can also protect themselves by purchasing credit 
default  swaps  (CDS),  which  are  contracts  insuring  against  the  default  of  a  particular  bond  or 
tranche. The buyer of these contracts pays a periodic fixed fee in exchange for a contingent payment 
in the event of credit default.  Estimates of the gross notional amount of outstanding credit default 
swaps in 2007 range from $45 trillion to $62 trillion. One can also directly trade indices that consist 
of portfolios of credit default swaps, such as the CDX in the United States or iTraxx in Europe. 
Anyone who purchased a AAA-rated tranche of a collateralized debt obligation, combined with a 
credit default swap, had reason to believe that the investment had low risk, because the probability 
of the CDS counterparty defaulting was considered to be small.  
 
Shortening the Maturity Structure to Tap Into Demand from Money Market Funds 
Most investors prefer assets with short maturities, such as short-term money market funds.  
It allows them to withdraw funds at short notice to accommodate their own funding needs (for 
example, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 2007) or it can serve as a commitment 
device to discipline banks with the threat of possible withdrawals (as in Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; 
Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Funds might also opt for short-term financing to signal their confidence 
in their ability to perform (Stein, 2005). On the other hand, most investment projects and mortgages 
have maturities measured in years or even decades. In the traditional banking model, commercial 
banks financed these loans with deposits that could be withdrawn at short notice. 
The same maturity mismatch was transferred to a ―shadow‖ banking system consisting of 
off-balance-sheet  investment  vehicles  and  conduits.  These  structured  investment  vehicles  raise 
funds by selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper with an average maturity of 90 days and 
medium-term notes with an average maturity of just over one year, primarily to money market 
funds.  The  short-term  assets  are  called  ―asset  backed‖  because  they  are  backed  by  a  pool  of 
mortgages or other loans as collateral. In the case of default, owners of the asset-backed commercial   5 
paper have the power to seize and sell the underlying collateral assets. Asset-backed commercial 
paper had become the dominant form of outstanding commercial paper by the start of 2006.  
  The  strategy  of  off-balance-sheet  vehicles—investing  in  long-term  assets  and  borrowing 
with short-term paper—exposes the banks to funding liquidity risk: Investors might suddenly stop 
buying asset-backed commercial paper, preventing these vehicles from rolling over their short-term 
debt. To ensure funding liquidity for the vehicle, the sponsoring bank grants a credit line to the 
vehicles, called a ―liquidity backstop.‖ As a result, the banking system still bears the liquidity risk 
from holding long-term assets and making short-term loans even though it does not appear on the 
banks‘ balance sheets. 
  Another important trend was that the maturity mismatch on the balance sheet of investment 
banks increased. This change was the result of a move towards financing balance sheets with short-
term  repurchase  agreements,  or  ―repos.‖  In  a  repo  contract,  a  firm  borrows  funds  by  selling  a 
collateral asset today and promising to repurchase it at a later date. The growth in repo financing as 
a fraction of investment banks' total assets is mostly due to an increase in overnight repos. The 
fraction of total investment bank assets were financed by overnight repos roughly doubled from 
2000 to 2007. Term repos with a maturity of up to three months have stayed roughly constant at as a 
fraction of total assets. This greater reliance on overnight financing required investment banks to 
roll over a large part of their funding on a daily basis. 
  In  summary,  leading  up  to  the  crisis,  commercial  and  investment  banks  were  heavily 
exposed to maturity mismatch both through granting liquidity backstops to their off-balance sheet 
vehicles and through their increased reliance on repo financing. Any reduction in funding liquidity 
could thus lead to significant stress for the financial system, as we witnessed starting in the summer 
of 2007.  
 
Rise in Popularity of Securitized and Structured Products 
  Structured financial products can cater to the needs of different investor groups. Risk can be 
shifted to those who wish to bear it, and it can be widely spread among many market participants. 
This allows for lower mortgage rates and lower interest rates on corporate and other types of loans. 
Besides  lower  interest  rates,  securitization  allows  certain  institutional  investors  to  hold  assets 
(indirectly)  that  they  were  previously  prevented  from  holding  by  regulatory  requirements.  For 
example, certain money market and pension funds that were allowed to invest only in AAA-rated   6 
fixed-income  securities  could  now  also  invest  in  a  AAA-rated  senior  tranche  of  a  portfolio 
constructed  from  BBB-rated  securities.  However,  a  large  part  of  the  credit  risk  never  left  the 
banking system, since banks, including sophisticated investment banks, were among the most active 
buyers of structured products (see for example, Duffie, 2008). This suggests that other, perhaps less 
worthy motives were also at work in encouraging the creation and purchase of these assets. 
  In  hindsight,  it  is  clear  that  one  distorting  force  leading  to  the  popularity  of  structured 
investment  vehicles  was  regulatory and ratings arbitrage.  The  Basel  I accord (an international 
agreement that sets guidelines for bank regulation) required that banks hold capital of at least 8 
percent of the loans on their balance sheets; this capital requirement (called a ―capital charge‖) was 
much  lower  for  contractual  credit  lines.  Moreover,  there  was  no  capital  charge  at  all  for 
―reputational‖ credit lines—noncontractual liquidity backstops that sponsoring banks provided to 
structured investment vehicles to maintain their reputation. Thus, moving a pool of loans into off-
balance-sheet vehicles, and then granting a credit line to that pool to ensure a AAA-rating, allowed 
banks to reduce the amount of capital they needed to hold to conform with Basel I regulations while 
the risk for the bank remained essentially unchanged. The subsequent Basel II accord, which went 
into effect on January 1, 2007, in Europe but is yet to be fully implemented in the United States, 
took some steps to correct this preferential treatment of noncontractual credit lines, but with little 
effect. While Basel II implemented capital charges based on asset ratings, banks were able to reduce 
their capital charges by pooling loans in off-balance-sheet vehicles. Because of the reduction of 
idiosyncratic risk through diversification, assets issued by these vehicles received a better rating 
than did the individual securities in the pool.
1 In addition, issuing short-term assets improved the 
overall rating even further, since banks sponsoring these structured investment vehicles were not 
sufficiently downgraded for granting liquidity backstops. 
Moreover, in retrospect, the statistical models of many professional  investors and credit-
rating agencies provided overly optimistic forecasts about structured finance products. One reason is 
that these models were  based on historically low mortgage default and delinquency rates . More 
importantly, past downturns in  housing  prices were  primarily regional  phenomena—the  United 
States had not experienced a nationwide decline in housing prices in the period following World 
                                                 
1 To see this, consider a bank that hypothetically holds two perfectly negatively correlated BBB-rated assets. If it were 
to hold the assets directly on its books it would face a high capital charge. On the other hand, if it were to bundle both 
assets in an SIV, the SIV could issue essentially risk-free AAA-rated assets which the bank can hold on its books at near 
zero capital charge. 
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War  II.  The  assumed  low  cross-regional  correlation  of  house  prices  generated  a  perceived 
diversification benefit that especially boosted the valuations of AAA-rated tranches, as explained in 
Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009). 
In  addition,  structured  products  may  have  received  more  favorable  ratings  compared  to 
corporate bonds because rating agencies collected higher fees for structured products. ''Rating at the 
edge''  might  also  have  contributed  to  favorable  ratings  of  structured  products  versus  corporate 
bonds. While a AAA-rated bond represents a band of risk ranging from a near-zero default risk to a 
risk that just makes it into the AAA-rated group, banks worked closely with the rating agencies to 
ensure that AAA tranches were always sliced in such a way that they just crossed the dividing line 
to  reach  the  AAA  rating.  As  a  consequence,  CDO  tranches  must  be  downgraded  when  an 
incremental change in the underlying default probabilities or correlations occurs.  Fund managers 
―searching for yield‖ were attracted to buying structured products because they seemingly offered 
high expected high returns with a small probability of catastrophic loss.  When the risk-free interest 
rate  is  low,  this  type  of  investment  will  be  especially  attractive  to  fund  managers,  whose 
compensations are linked to a percentage share of the upside but do not become negative in the 
event of losses.
2  In addition, some fund managers may have favored the relatively illiquid junior 
tranches precisely because they trade so infrequently and were therefore hard to value. These 
managers could make their monthly returns appear attractively smooth over time because they had 
some flexibility with regard to when they could revalue their portfolios. 
 
Consequences: Cheap Credit and the Housing Boom 
  The rise in popularity of securitized products ultimately led to a flood of cheap credit, and 
lending  standards  fell.    Because  a  substantial  part  of  the  risk  will  be  borne  by  other  financial 
institutions, banks essentially faced only the ―pipeline risk‖ of holding a loan for some months until 
the risks  were passed on, so  they had little incentive to  take particular care in  approving loan 
applications  and  monitoring  loans.  Keys  et  al.  (2008)  offer  empirical  evidence  that  increased 
securitization  led  to  a  decline  in  credit  quality.  Mortgage  brokers  offered  teaser  rates,  no-
documentation mortgages, piggyback mortgages (a combination of two mortgages that eliminates 
                                                 
2 The risk-free rate determines the position of the kink of this call-option-like payoff structure. In an environment with a 
high risk-free interest rate, the fund manager can essentially guarantee a positive payoff just by investing in the risk-free 
asset. By following a riskier strategy, he puts this payoff at risk. When the interest rate is close to zero, this ―guaranteed 
payoff‖ is very small, so the manager has less to lose from taking on the additional risk.   8 
the  need  for  a  down  payment),  and  NINJA  (―no  income,  no  job  or  assets‖)  loans.  All  these 
mortgages were granted under the premise that background checks are unnecessary because house 
prices could only rise, and a borrower could thus always refinance a loan using the increased value 
of the house. 
  This combination of cheap credit and low lending standards resulted in the housing frenzy 
that laid the foundations for the crisis. By early 2007, many observers were concerned about the risk 
of  a  ―liquidity  bubble‖  or  ―credit  bubble‖  (for  example,  Berman,  2007).  However,  they  were 
reluctant to bet against the bubble. As in the theoretical model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 
2003), it was perceived to be more profitable to ride the wave than to lean against it. Nevertheless, 
there was a widespread feeling that the day of reckoning would eventually come. Citigroup‘s former 
chief executive officer, Chuck Prince, summed up the situation on July 10, 2007 by referring to 
Keynes‘s analogy between bubbles and musical chairs (Nakamoto and Wighton, 2007): ―When the 
music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, 
you‘ve got to get up and dance. We‘re still dancing.‖  This game of musical chairs, combined with 
the vulnerability of banks to dry-ups in funding liquidity, ultimately unfolded into the crisis that 
began in 2007. 
 
The Unfolding of the Crisis: Event Logbook 
 
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
  The trigger for the liquidity crisis was an increase in subprime mortgage defaults, which was 
first noted in February 2007. Figure 1 shows the ABX price index, which is based on the price of 
credit default swaps. As this price index declines, the cost of insuring a basket of mortgages of a 
certain rating against default increases. On May 4, 2007, UBS shut down its internal hedge fund, 
Dillon  Read,  after  suffering  about  $125  million  of  subprime-related  losses.  Later  that  month, 
Moody's put 62 tranches across 21 U.S. subprime deals on ―downgrade review,‖ indicating that it 
was likely these tranches would be downgraded in the near future. This review led to a deterioration 
of the prices of mortgage-related products.  
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Figure 1: Decline in Mortgage Credit Default Swap ABX Indices 
        
 
Note: Each ABX index is based on a basket of 20 credit default swaps referencing asset-backed 
securities containing subprime mortgages of different ratings. An investor seeking to insure against 
the default of the underlying securities pays a periodic fee (spread) which – at initiation of the series 
– is set to guarantee an index price of 100. This is the reason why the ABX 7-1 series, initiated in 
January  2007,  start  at  a  price  of  100.  In  addition,  when  purchasing  the  default  insurance  after 
initiation, the protection buyer has to pay an upfront fee of (100 – ABX price). As the price of the 
ABX drops, the upfront fee rises and previous sellers of Credit Default Swaps suffer losses. 
Source: LehmanLive.  
 
  Rating downgrades of other tranches by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch unnerved the 
credit markets in June and July 2007. In mid-June, two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns had trouble 
meeting margin calls, leading Bear Stearns to inject $3.2 billion in order to protect its reputation. 
Then a major U.S. home loan lender, Countrywide Financial Corp., announced an earnings drop on   10 
July 24. And on July 26, an index from the National Association of Home Builders revealed that 
new home sales had declined 6.6 percent year-on-year, and the largest U.S. homebuilder reported a 
loss in that quarter. From then through late in 2008, house prices and sales continued to drop. 
 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
  In  July  2007,  amid  widespread  concern  about  how  to  value  structured  products  and  an 
erosion  of  confidence  in  the  reliability  of  ratings,  the  market  for  short-term  asset-backed 
commercial paper began to dry up. As Figure 2 shows, the market for non-asset-backed commercial 
paper (be it financial or nonfinancial) during this time was affected only slightly—which suggests 
that the turmoil was driven primarily by mortgage-backed securities. 
  IKB, a small German bank, was the first European victim of the subprime crisis.  In July 
2007, its conduit was unable to roll over asset-backed commercial paper and IKB proved unable to 
provide the promised credit line. After hectic negotiations, a €3.5 billion rescue package involving 
public and private banks was announced. On July 31, American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. 
announced its inability to fund lending obligations, and it subsequently declared bankruptcy on 
August 6. On August 9, 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas froze redemptions for three investment 
funds, citing its inability to value structured products. 
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Figure 2: Outstanding asset-backed commercial paper and unsecured commercial paper.  
           
Source: Federal Reserve Board. 
 
Following this event, a variety of market signals showed that money market participants had 
become reluctant to lend to each other. For example, the average quoted interest rate on asset-
backed commercial paper jumped from 5.39 percent to 6.14 percent over the period August 8-10, 
2007.  All  through  August  2007,  rating  agencies  continued  to  downgrade  various  conduits  and 
structured investment vehicles. 
 
The LIBOR, Repo, and Federal Funds Markets 
In addition to the commercial paper market, banks use the repo market, the federal funds 
market, and the interbank market to finance themselves. Repurchase agreements, or ―repos,‖ allow 
market participants to obtain collateralized funding by selling their own or their clients‘ securities 
and agreeing to repurchase them when the loan matures. The U.S. federal funds rate is the overnight 
interest  rate  at  which  banks  lend  reserves  to  each  other  to  meet  the  central  bank‘s  reserve   12 
requirements. In the interbank or LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) market, banks make 
unsecured, short-term (typically overnight to three-month) loans to each other. The interest rate is 
individually agreed upon. LIBOR is an average indicative interest rate quote for such loans. 
An  interest  rate  spread  measures  the  difference  in  interest  rates  between  two  bonds  of 
different  risk.  These  credit  spreads  had  shrunk  to  historically  low  levels  during  the  ―liquidity 
bubble‖  but  they  began  to  surge  upward  in  the  summer  of  2007.  Historically,  many  market 
observers focused on the TED spread, the difference between the risky LIBOR rate and the risk-free 
U.S. Treasury bill rate. In times of uncertainty, banks charge higher interest for unsecured loans, 
which  increases  the  LIBOR  rate.  Further,  banks  want  to  get  first-rate  collateral,  which  makes 
holding Treasury bonds more attractive and pushes down the Treasury bond rate. For both reasons, 
the TED spread widens in times of crises, as shown by the sum of the shaded areas in Figure 3. The 
LIBOR-OIS spread abstracts from the fact that Treasuries are especially sought after collateral in 
times crisis. This ―collateral effect‖ can also shows up in the MBS-GC repos spread, the spread 
between the repo rate one has to pay using mortgage-backed securities as collateral compared to the 
repo rate using Treasury bonds as collateral. Another commonly viewed credit spread is the one 
between 30-year ―agency bonds‖, issued by the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, and 30-year Treasury bonds. This spread also moved in a similar fashion – sometimes 
peaking before the TED spread.      13 
Figure 3: Interest Rate Spreads 
 
Note: The top panel shows the LIBOR-OIS spread (dark shaded area). The TED spread (LIBOR minus the 
Treasury bill rate) is given by the sum of two shaded areas. The contractions of the T-Bill-OIS spread shows 
that Treasury bonds are especially sought-after collateral in times of crisis. The dashed line in the top panel 
shows the ABCP rate minus overnight index swap rate (OIS). The lower panel depicts the spread between 
mortgage backed repos and general collateral repos and the 30 year agency spread. 
Sources: Bloomberg, LehmanLive, and Federal Reserve Board. 
 
Central Banks Step Forward  
In the period August 1-9, 2007, many quantitative hedge funds, which use trading strategies 
based on statistical models, suffered large losses, triggering margin calls and fire sales. Crowded 
trades caused high correlation across quant trading strategies (for details, see Brunnermeier, 2008a; 
Khandani and Lo, 2007). The first ―illiquidity wave‖ on the interbank market started on August 9.   14 
At that time, the perceived default and liquidity risks of banks rose significantly, driving up the 
LIBOR. In response to the freezing up of the interbank market on August 9, the European Central 
Bank injected €95 billion in overnight credit into the interbank market. The U.S. Federal Reserve 
followed suit, injecting $24 billion.  
To alleviate the liquidity crunch, the Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate by half a 
percentage point to 5.75 percent on August 17, 2007, broadened the type of collateral that banks 
could post, and lengthened the lending horizon to 30 days. However, the 7,000 or so banks that can 
borrow  at  the  Fed's  discount  window  are  historically  reluctant  to  do  so  because  of  the  stigma 
associated  with  it—that  is,  the  fear  that  discount  window  borrowing  might  signal  a  lack  of 
creditworthiness on the interbank market. On September 18, the Fed lowered the federal funds rate 
by half a percentage point (50 basis points) to 4.75 percent and the discount rate to 5.25 percent. 
The  U.K.  bank  Northern  Rock  was  subsequently  unable  to  finance  its  operations  through  the 
interbank market and received a temporary liquidity support facility from the Bank of England. 
Northern Rock ultimately fell victim to the first bank run in the United Kingdom for more than a 
century as discussed in Shin (2009). 
 
Continuing Write-downs of Mortgage-related Securities 
October 2007 was characterized by a series of write-downs. For a time, major international 
banks seemed to have cleaned their books. The Fed's liquidity injections appeared effective. Also, 
various sovereign wealth funds invested a total of more than $38 billion in equity from November 
2007 until mid-January 2008 in major U.S. banks (IMF, 2008). 
But matters worsened again starting in November 2007, when it became clear that an earlier 
estimate of the total loss in the mortgage markets, around $200 billion, had to be revised upward. 
Many banks were forced to take additional, larger write-downs. The TED spread widened again as 
the LIBOR peaked in mid-December of 2007 (Figure 3). This change convinced the Fed to cut the 
federal funds rate by 0.25 percentage point on December 11, 2007. 
At this point, the Federal Reserve had discerned that broad cuts in the federal funds rate and 
the discount rate were not reaching the banks caught in the liquidity crunch. On December 12, 2007, 
the Fed announced the creation of the Term Auction Facility (TAF), through which commercial 
banks could bid anonymously for 28-day loans against a broad set of collateral, including various   15 
mortgage-backed securities. For banks, the effect was quite similar to borrowing from the discount 
window—except it could be done anonymously. This step helped resuscitate interbank lending. 
 
The Monoline Insurers  
Amid ongoing bank write-downs, the investment community's primary worry by January 
and  early  February  2008  was  the  potential  downgrading  of  the  ―monoline  insurers.‖  Unlike 
insurance companies which are active in many business lines, monoline insurers focused completely 
on one product, insuring municipal bonds against default (in order to guarantee a AAA-rating). 
More recently, however, the thinly capitalized monoline insurers had also extended guarantees to 
mortgage-backed securities and other structured finance products.  
As losses in the mortgage market mounted, the monoline insurers were on the verge of being 
downgraded by all three major rating agencies. This change would have led to a loss of AAA-
insurance for hundreds of municipal bonds, corporate bonds, and structured products, resulting in a 
sweeping rating downgrade across financial instruments with a face value of $2.4 trillion and a 
subsequent severe sell-off of these securities. To appreciate the importance, note that money market 
funds pledge never to ―break the buck‖—that is, they promise to maintain the value of every dollar 
invested and hence demand that underwriters  of assets  agree to  buy back  the assets  if needed. 
However,  this  buy-back  guarantee  is  conditional  on  the  underlying  assets  being  AAA-rated. 
Consequently, a rating downgrade would have triggered a huge sell-off of these assets by money 
market funds. 
  On January 19, 2008, the rating agency Fitch downgraded one of the monoline insurers, 
Ambac,  unnerving  worldwide  financial  markets.  While  U.S.  financial  markets  were  closed  for 
Martin Luther King Day, share prices dropped precipitously worldwide. Emerging markets in Asia 
lost about 15 percent, and Japanese and European markets were down around 5 percent. The sell-off 
continued in the morning of Tuesday, January 22, in Asia and Europe. Dow Jones and Nasdaq 
futures were down 5 to 6 percent, indicating a large drop in the U.S. equity market as well. Given 
this environment, the Fed decided to cut the federal funds rate by 0.75 percentage point to 3.5 
percent—the  Fed's  first  ―emergency  cut‖  since  1982.  As  it  turned  out,  however,  part  of  the 
downturn can be attributed to the aggressive unwinding of Societe Generale‘s €49.9 billion position 
that  rogue  trader  Jérôme  Kerviel  had  secretly  acquired  in  unauthorized  trading.  At  its  regular 
meeting on January 30, the Federal Open Market Committee cut the federal funds rate another 0.5   16 
percentage point. The potential downgrade of monocline insurers also created significant selling 
pressure  on  municipal  bond  market  and  other  so-called  auction  rated  securities  (ARS)  that  are 
traded in an auction at regular intervals. Since ARS brokers were reluctant to commit capital and 
make markets, many rate-setting auctions failed, sales were rationed, and the remaining transactions 
occurred at  prespecified penalty interest  rate. The first  auction failed on February 7, 2007. On 
February 13, 80 percent of the auctions failed. 
 
Bear Stearns 
  In early March 2008, events put pressure on the investment bank Bear Stearns. First, the 
credit spreads between agency bonds (issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and Treasury bonds 
started to widen again. The widening spreads hurt Carlyle Capital, an Amsterdam-listed hedge fund, 
which was heavily invested in agency bonds. When Carlyle could not meet its margin calls, its 
collateral assets were seized and partially liquidated. This action depressed the price of agency 
bonds further. Not only did Bear Stearns hold large amounts of agency paper on its own, but it was 
also one of the creditors to Carlyle. 
  A second event was that of March 11, 2008, when the Federal Reserve announced its $200 
billion Term Securities Lending Facility. This program allowed investment banks to swap agency 
and other mortgage-related bonds for Treasury bonds for up to 28 days. To avoid stigmatization, the 
extent to which investment banks made use of this facility was to be kept secret. However, some 
market participants might have (mistakenly) interpreted this move as a sign that the Fed knew that 
some investment bank might be in difficulty. Naturally, they pointed to the smallest, most leveraged 
investment bank with large mortgage exposure: Bear Stearns. 
  Moreover, after trading hours ended on March 11, 2008, a hedge fund sent Goldman Sachs 
an e-mail asking it to step into a contractual relationship that would increase Goldman‘s direct 
exposure  to  Bear  Stearns.  Given  the  late  request,  Goldman  only  ―novated‖  (accepted)  the  new 
contract only on the morning of March 12. In the meantime, the late acceptance was (wrongly) 
interpreted as a refusal and was leaked to the media, causing unease among Bear Stearns‘s hedge 
fund clients. This incident might have contributed to the run on Bear by its hedge fund clients and 
other  counterparties.  Bear's  liquidity  situation  worsened  dramatically  the  next  day  as  it  was 
suddenly unable to secure funding on the repo market.   17 
  Bear Stearns had  about 150  million  trades  spread across various counterparties.   It  was 
therefore considered ―too interconnected‖ to be allowed to fail suddenly. Some big party had to step 
in to minimize counterparty credit risk. Over the weekend, officials from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York helped broker a deal, through which JPMorgan Chase would acquire Bear Stearns for 
$236 million, or $2 per share. By comparison, Bear Stearns's shares had traded at around $150 less 
than a year before. The New York Fed also agreed to grant a $30 billion loan to JPMorgan Chase. 
On Sunday night, the Fed cut the discount rate from 3.5 percent to 3.25 percent and for the first time 
opened  the  discount  window  to  investment  banks,  via  the  new  Primary  Dealer  Credit  Facility 
(PDCF),  an  overnight  funding  facility  for  investment  banks.  This  step  temporarily  eased  the 
liquidity problems of the other investment banks, including Lehman Brothers. 
  Overall, the market valued the deal positively for JPMorgan Chase. Its shares gained 2.7 
percent the Monday after the deal was announced. However, under the deal, Bear Stearns's equity-
holders  lost  almost  everything,  while  its  debt-holders  did  not  lose  anything.  In  addition,  some 
political opposition to the loan surfaced. Indeed, the hostility among many equity-holders was such 
that uncertainty about the completion of the deal remained, which led to a continued bleeding of 
Bear Stearns's customer base. In response, JPMorgan Chase increased its offer to $10 per share—
and  also  agreed  to  assume  the  first  $1  billion  in  losses  from  the  loan,  to  overcome  political 
opposition.  
 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
  Mortgage delinquency rates continued to increase in the subsequent months. By mid-June 
2008, the interest rate spread between ―agency bonds‖ of the government-sponsored enterprises 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Treasury bonds had widened again. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
at that time were two publicly traded but government-chartered institutions that securitized a large 
fraction of U.S. mortgages and had about $1.5 trillion in bonds outstanding. After IndyMac, a large 
private mortgage broker, was put in conservatorship by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) on Friday, July 11, problems at Fannie and Freddie flared up, prompting Treasury Secretary 
Henry  Paulson  on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  July  13,  to  announce  plans  to  make  their  implicit 
government guarantee explicit.  Despite this support, the stock prices of Fannie and Freddie slid 
further in the subsequent weeks, ultimately forcing government officials to put them in federal 
conservatorship  on  September  7.  This  step  constituted  a  ―credit  event‖  for  a  large  number  of   18 
outstanding credit default swaps, triggering large payments to those who had bought these swaps. 
Note that Ginnie Mae, the third Government-Sponsored Enterprise, always enjoyed full government 
guarantee. 
 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG 
Unlike Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers had survived the fallout in March 2008, but only 
narrowly. It subsequently made heavy use of the Fed‘s new Primary Dealer Credit Facility, but did 
not issue enough new equity to strengthen its balance sheet. It felt that stepping forward as a single 
bank to issue new shares (without a concerted effort across all banks) would be very costly, because 
it would be perceived as a signal of desperation. As Lehman‘s share price eroded, and especially as 
it became clear on September 9, 2008, that the state-controlled Korea Development Bank would not 
buy the firm, Lehman‘s shares plunged. Timothy Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New  York,  convened  a  weekend  meeting  with  all  major  banks‘  most  senior  executives  on 
September 12-14 to secure Lehman‘s future. Initially, Barclays and Bank of America were named 
as possible suitors. However, they refused to take over Lehman without a government guarantee. 
Eventually,  Treasury  and  Fed  officials  decided  not  to  offer  a  guarantee  funded  by  taxpayers, 
especially since Lehman, as well as its clients and counterparties, had had ample time to prepare for 
the  liquidity  shortage.  Already  on  Sunday  afternoon,  the  International  Swaps  and  Derivatives 
Association  (ISDA)  offered  an  exceptional  trading  session  to  net  various  offsetting  Lehman 
positions, conditional on Lehman filing for bankruptcy at midnight. Consequently, Lehman had to 
declare bankruptcy early Monday morning. In the meantime, reading the signs, Merrill Lynch had 
already announced on Sunday that it had sold itself to Bank of America for $50 billion. 
The effects of Lehman‘s bankruptcy would ripple throughout the global financial markets, 
but not before AIG, a large international insurance company, disclosed that they faced a serious 
liquidity shortage. Like investment banks, AIG had been increasingly active in the credit derivatives 
business, including credit default swaps. On Tuesday, September 16, 2008, AIG‘s stock price fell 
more  than  90  percent,  capping  off  a  large  decline  from  the  previous  days.  Owing  to  AIG‘s 
interconnectedness  in  the  credit  derivatives  business,  the  Federal  Reserve  quickly  organized  a 
bailout of $85 billion in exchange for an 80 percent equity stake. The AIG bailout was extended by 
a further $37 billion in October and another $40 billion in November.   19 
The  ripple  effects  of  Lehman‘s  demise  were  difficult  to  predict,  because  Lehman  had 
counterparties across the globe. First, and most importantly, many money market funds suffered 
losses. Some ―broke the buck‖—their share price dropped below $1—while others supported their 
funds via cash injections. To avoid the broad repercussions of a run on money market funds, the 
U.S. Treasury set aside $80 billion to guarantee brokers‘ money market funds. Second, the prices 
paid for credit default swaps that offer protection against defaults of the remaining banks soared, as 
each bank tried to protect itself against counterparty credit risk—that is, the risk that other banks 
would  default  (see  Figure  4  below).  Third,  financial  non  asset-backed  commercial  paper 
experienced a sharp fall (see Figure 2), which led to the introduction of the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility by the Fed. 
 
Figure 4: Credit Default Swap Spreads 
 
Note: CDS spreads reflect the annual insurance premium one has to pay to insure a bond against default in 
percent of the notional amount. The scale on the left panel is between 0 to 5 percent, while on the right panel 
the  scale  is  between  0  to  30  percent.  Most  striking  is  that  the  Bear-Stearns  crisis  in  March  2008  was 
relatively modest compared to the fall-out of Lehman‘s failure in September 2008. Investment banks and 
AIG were particularly hit.  
   20 
Coordinated Bailout, Stock Market Decline, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citibank 
As can be seen by the extreme spike in the TED spread in Figure 3, the credit markets 
deteriorated significantly in subsequent weeks.
3 Washington Mutual suffered a ―silent‖ bank run.  
Instead of publicly queuing in front of bank tellers, customers and fund managers withdrew funds 
electronically.  Soon  afterwards,  Washington  Mutual  was  placed  in  receivership  by  the  Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and then sold to JPMorgan Chase. In a move also facilitated 
by the FDIC, Wachovia announced on September 29 that it was selling its banking operation to 
Citibank, but after a bidding contest, Wachovia ultimately fell into the hands of Wells Fargo.  
The overall stock market fell off a cliff, losing about $8 trillion in the year after its peak in 
October 2007. More importantly, Wall Street‘s problems seemed to spill over to Main Street. Credit 
for firms and local and state governments tightened, infecting the global economy. It became more 
and more clear that a proactive, coordinated action across all solvent  banks  had to  replace the 
reactive piecemeal approach. After news broke on September 19, 2008, that the Treasury Secretary 
would propose a $700 billion bailout plan, a political quarrel started and ultimately led to a bailout 
plan that included foreclosure-mitigation elements for homeowners, provisions to purchase troubled 
mortgage assets, and a coordinated forced recapitalization of banks. Despite this, Citibank needed 
additional support in November (see also its CDS spread in Figure 4), and several facilities were 
established that enabled the Fed to buy commercial paper and almost any type of asset-backed 
security and agency paper. The Fed‘s balance sheet roughly doubled from about $1.2 trillion in 
November 2007 to about $2.3 trillion in December 2008. On December 16, 2008 the Fed set its 
target interest rate range between zero and a quarter percent. 
Economic events and political actions and reactions have continued to unfold. But for the 
purposes of this paper, the key question is how the original loss of several hundred billion dollars in 
the mortgage market was sufficient to trigger such an extraordinary series of worldwide financial 
and economic consequences.  
 
   
                                                 
3 Focusing on the TED spread here is somewhat misleading since part of the rise in LIBOR is due to central banks‘ 
increase in collateralized lending. Collateralized lending enjoys seniority and hence makes the more junior unsecured 
LIBOR lending more risky and therefore more expensive.   21 
 
Amplifying Mechanisms and Recurring Themes 
 
The sequence of events described above is a vivid reminder of how shocks can get amplified 
to a full-blown financial crisis when liquidity evaporates. Liquidity dries up when frictions limit 
optimal risk sharing and hinder flows of funds to expert investors (i.e., funds are separated from 
expertise). It is useful to divide the concept of liquidity into two categories: funding liquidity and 
market liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). 
Funding liquidity describes the ease with which expert investors and arbitrageurs can obtain 
funding from (possibly less informed) financiers. Funding liquidity is high—and markets are said to 
be ―awash with liquidity‖—when it is easy to raise money. Typically, when a leveraged trader, such 
as a dealer, hedge fund, or investment bank, purchases an asset, he uses the purchased asset as 
collateral and borrows (short-term) against it. However, he cannot borrow the entire price. The 
difference between the security's price and its value as collateral—the margin or haircut —must be 
financed by the trader's own equity capital. Margin lending is short-term since margins and haircuts 
can be adapted to market conditions on a daily basis. Outside equity or long-term debt financing is 
typically more expensive and difficult to obtain when the trader suffers from the debt-overhang 
problem.
4 As a consequence, traders tend not to carry much excess capital and thus increasing 
margins and haircuts force traders to de-leverage their positions (that is, to sell part of their assets). 
Financial institutions that rely substantially on short-term (commercial) paper or repo 
contracts have to roll over their debt. An inability to roll over this debt—if, for example, the market 
for commercial paper dries up—is equivalent to margins increasing to 100 percent, because the firm 
becomes unable to use the asset as a basis for raising funds. Similarly, withdrawals of demand 
deposits or capital redemptions from an investment fund have the same effect as an increase in 
margins. Funding liquidity risk can thus take three forms: 1) margin/haircut funding risk, or the risk 
that margins and haircuts will change; 2) rollover risk, or the risk that it will be more costly or 
impossible to roll over short-term borrowing; and 3) redemption risk, or the risk that demand 
depositors of banks or even equity holders of e.g. hedge funds withdraw funds. All three 
                                                 
4 The debt-overhang problem arises when even informed financiers refrain from injecting additional equity since the 
proceeds of the  investment are primarily going to existing debt-holders rather than the new equity holders (Myers 
1977).   22 
incarnations of funding liquidity risk are only detrimental when the assets can be sold only at fire-
sale prices—that is, when market liquidity is low. 
  Market liquidity is low when it is difficult to raise money by selling the asset (instead of by 
borrowing against it). In other words, market liquidity is low when selling the asset depresses the 
sale  price  and  hence  it  becomes  very  costly  to  shrink  the  balance  sheet.  Market  liquidity  is 
equivalent to the relative ease of finding somebody who takes on the other side of the trade. The 
literature distinguishes between three sub-forms of market liquidity (Kyle, 1985): 1) the bid-ask 
spread, which measures how much traders lose if they sell one unit of an asset and then buy it back 
right away; 2) market depth, which shows how many units traders can sell or buy at the current bid 
or ask price without moving the price; and 3) market resiliency, which tells us how long it will take 
for prices that have temporarily fallen to bounce back. While a single trader might move the price a 
bit, large price swings occur when ―crowded trades‖ are unwound—that is, when a number of 
traders attempt to exit from identical positions in unison. 
  At  an  abstract  level,  we  can  think  about  market  liquidity  and  funding  liquidity  in  the 
following way. Market liquidity refers to the transfer of the asset with its entire cash flow, while 
funding liquidity is like issuing debt, equity, or any other financial contract against a cash flow 
generated by an asset or trading strategy. 
  The  mechanisms  that  explain  why  liquidity  can  suddenly  evaporate  operate  through  the 
interaction of market liquidity and funding liquidity. Through these mechanisms, a relatively small 
shock can cause liquidity to dry up suddenly and carry the potential for a full-blown financial crisis. 
This section outlines several mechanisms that amplify the initial shock. 
   
Borrower's Balance Sheet Effects: Loss Spiral and Margin Spiral 
  A loss spiral arises for leveraged investors since a decline in assets value erodes their net 
worth much faster than their gross worth (because of their leverage) and the amount that they can 
borrow  falls.  For  example,  consider an  investor who buys  $100 million worth  of assets  on 10 
percent  margin.  This  investor  finances  only  $10  million  with  its  own capital  and  borrows  $90 
million.  The  leverage  ratio  is  10.  Now  suppose  that  the  value  of  the  acquired  asset  declines 
temporarily to $95 million. The investor, who started out with $10 million in capital, now has lost 
$5 million and has only $5 million of its own capital remaining. Holding the leverage ratio constant 
at 10, this investor is forced to reduce the overall position to $50 million—which means selling   23 
assets  worth  $45  million  exactly  when  the  price  is  low.  These  sales  depress  the  price  further, 
inducing  more  selling  and  so  on.  This  loss spiral  arises  as  an  equilibrium  because  some  other 
potential  buyers  with  expertise  may  face  similar  constraints  at  the  time  (as  pointed  out  in  the 
seminal paper by Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) and also because other potential buyers find it more 
profitable to wait out the loss spiral before reentering the market. In  more extreme cases, other 
traders  might  even  engage  in  ―predatory  trading‖,  deliberately  forcing  others  to  liquidate  their 
positions at fire-sale prices. (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005). 
 
Figure 4: The two liquidity spirals: loss spiral and margin spiral. 
                
Note: Funding problems force leveraged investors to unwind their positions causing 1) more losses and 2) 
higher margins and haircuts, which in turn exacerbates the funding problems and so on. 
Source: Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
 
The margin/haircut spiral reinforces the loss spiral, as shown in Figure 5. As margins or haircuts 
rise, the investor has to sell even more because the investor needs to reduce its leverage ratio (which   24 
was held constant in the loss spiral). Margins and haircuts spike in times of large price drops leading 
to a general tightening of lending. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that a vicious cycle 
emerges, where higher margins and haircuts force de-leveraging and more sales, which increase 
margins further and force more sales, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Adrian and 
Shin (2009) confirm this spiral empirically for investment banks.  
The documented fact that margins and haircuts, as well as lending standards, increase after 
large  price  drops  seems  counterintuitive,  because  a  price  reduction  that  results  from  a  lack  of 
liquidity is likely to be temporary, and investors with the necessary expertise face a great buying 
opportunity. Hence, one might think that lenders would be willing to lend more freely by lowering 
margins after prices have dropped.  
There are at least three reasons why exactly the opposite is true.
5 First, unexpected price 
shocks may be a harbinger of higher future volatility (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). And when 
volatility increases, margins and haircuts increase. An extreme example was the situation in August 
2007, when the asset-backed commercial paper market dried up completely. Prior to the crisis, 
asset-backed commercial paper was almost risk-free because of overcollateralization. However, in 
August 2007, the overcollateralization cushion evaporated, making the assets much more risky. 
Consequently, investors were unwilling to let structured investment vehicles roll -over their debt. 
The second reason why margins increase when prices drop suddenly is that asymmetric-information 
frictions emerge. Financiers become especially careful about accepting assets as collateral if they 
fear  receiving  a  particularly  bad  selection  of  assets.  They  might,  for  example,  be  worried  that 
structure investment vehicles sold the good, ―sellable‖ assets and left as collateral only the bad, less 
valuable, ―lemons.‖ Finally, if lenders naively estimate future volatility using past data, then a large 
price  drop  leads  to  higher  volatility  estimates  and  higher  margins—even  though  a  price  drop 
potentially reflects a great buying opportunity. 
It is individually rational to expose oneself to the risk of getting caught in a liquidity spiral 
by holding highly levered positions with a mismatch in asset-liability maturities, although it can be 
socially costly. Each individual speculator takes future prices as given and hence does not take into 
                                                 
5 A number of academic papers focus on the loss spiral. Most models produce a cushioning effect of margins and 
haircuts since margins decrease at times of crisis in these models (for example, Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; He and 
Krishnamurthy, 2008). In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) the ratio between asset value and credit limit is constant. In 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Fisher (1933) lending standards deteriorate, in Geanakoplos (2003) margins increase 
during crises.    25 
account that unloading assets will cause some adverse effects on other speculators by forcing them 
to sell their positions as well. This ―fire-sale externality‖ is the primary reason for bank regulation.
6 
  The loss spiral is more pronounced for stocks with low  market liquidity, because selling 
them at a time of financial distress will bring about a greater price drop than selling a more liquid 
asset would. For many structured finance products, market liquidity is so low that no reliable price 
exists because no trade takes place. As a consequence, owners have considerable discretion in what 
value to place on the asset. Selling some of these assets in a financial crisis would establish a low 
price and force the holder to mark down remaining holdings. Hence, investors are reluctant to do  




So far, we have focused on the balance sheets of the borrowers and have assumed that 
lenders have deep pockets. When lenders also have limited capital, they restrict their lending as their 
own  financial  situation  worsens.  We  can  distinguish  two  main  mechanisms:  moral  hazard  in 
monitoring and precautionary hoarding. 
  Most  lending  is  intermediated  by  banks  that  have  expertise  in  monitoring  a  borrower's 
investment decisions. For intermediators to exert sufficient effort in monitoring, they must have a 
sufficiently high stake of their own. Moral hazard arises when the net worth of the intermediaries‘ 
stake falls because intermediaries may then reduce their monitoring effort, forcing the market to fall 
back to direct lending without monitoring (Holmström and Tirole, 1997, 1998). 
  Precautionary hoarding arises if lenders are afraid that they might suffer from interim shocks 
and that they will need funds for their own projects and trading strategies. Precautionary hoarding 
therefore increases when 1) the likelihood of interim shocks increases, and 2) outside funds are 
expected to be difficult to obtain. 
  The  troubles  in  the  interbank  lending  market  in  2007-08  are  a  textbook  example  of 
precautionary  hoarding  by  individual  banks.  As  it  became  apparent  that  conduits,  structured 
                                                 
6  While most current risk measures like Value-at-Risk (VaR) focus on the risk of an individual financial institution, 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) develop a new risk measure, ―CoVaR,‖ that explicitly takes the risk spillovers into 
account.  
 
7  Funding constraints need not be binding for liquidity spirals to arise. Simply the fear that funding constraints might be 
binding in the future makes speculators and arbitrageurs reluctant  to invest in a way that will correct mispricing and 
provide market liquidity. This idea is similar to the concept of the ―limits to arbitrage‖ explored in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997).   26 
investment vehicles, and other off-balance-sheet vehicles would likely draw on credit lines extended 
by their sponsored bank, each bank's uncertainty about its own funding needs skyrocketed. At the 
same time, it became more uncertain whether banks could tap into the interbank market after a 
potential interim shock, since it was not known to what extent other banks faced similar problems. 
These  effects  led  to  sharp  spikes  in  the  interbank  market  interest  rate,  LIBOR,  relative  to  the 
Treasury bill interest rate.
8 
 
Runs on Financial Institutions 
  In the days before deposit insurance, everybody had an incentive to be the first to withdraw 
funds from a possibly troubled bank, because those who withdraw their money early get their full 
amount while those who move late might not. Late movers receive less for two reasons: 1) if the run 
occurred  for  fundamental  reasons—say,  the  bank  invested  in  bad  projects—there  may  not  be 
enough asset value left to pay those who withdraw late, and 2) if the run occurred for funding-
liquidity reasons, early withdrawals force a bank to liquidate long-maturity assets at fire-sale prices 
because market liquidity for those assets is low. The sale of long-maturity assets below their fair 
value leads to an erosion of the bank's wealth and thus leaves less for those who withdraw their 
money late. Under both scenarios, every investor has an incentive to preempt others and run to the 
bank.
9 A first-mover advantage triggers a dynamic preemption motive, which can lead to socially 
inefficient outcomes. 
  Deposit insurance has made bank runs almost obsolete, but runs can occur on other financial 
institutions. Not rolling over commercial paper is , in effect, a run on the issuer of  asset-backed 
commercial paper. Furthermore,  Bear Stearns essentially experienced a bank run in March 2008 
when hedge funds, which typically park a sizable amount of liquid wealth with their prime brokers, 
pulled out  those funds.  In September 2008,  AIG faced a  ―margin  run‖ as  explained in  Gorton 
(2008). Several counterparties requested additional collateral from AIG for its credit default swap 
                                                 
8  While the above described mechanisms rely on financial frictions and lack of expertise, Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2008) argue that investors have a difficult time assigning probabilities to the different possible outcomes in times of 
crises. This argument seems reasonable, especially for structured products, since only limited historical data is available 
for forecasting. Thus, investors become even more wary than the observed increase in volatility might seem to justify, 
and they will demand an additional uncertainty premium for holding potentially risky assets.  
 
9 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is the seminal paper on bank runs. Allen and Gale (2007) and Freixas and Rochet (1997), 
and references therein, are further useful starting points. Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Morris and Shin (2004) study 
runs on financial markets.  
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positions. These requests would have brought the firm down if the Fed had not injected additional 
funds.  
  While classic models of bank runs focus on debt-holders, one may argue that the problem 
also extends to equity-holders, such as investors in a hedge fund or mutual funds (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Equity-holders who withdraw their capital receive a share of the hedge fund's net 
asset value. In this case, an early-mover advantage arises to the extent that fund managers sell liquid 
assets first. To see this point, consider a fund that holds $50 million in highly liquid cash and $50 
million in hard-to-sell illiquid securities that at short notice can be sold for only $30 million. If the 
fund services early withdrawals using its cash cushion, then early withdrawers receive their full 
share of the mark-to-market net asset value of $100 million. But once the fund has to sell the illiquid 
assets  under  pressure  to  pay  out  the  remaining  investors,  net  asset  value  declines  and  late 
withdrawers receive only a percentage share of the sale price of the remaining assets, which is $30 
million, not $50 million. In sum, a first-mover advantage can make financial institutions in general, 
not only banks, subject to runs. 
 
Network Effects: Counterparty Credit Risk and Gridlock Risk 
  All  our  settings  so  far  have  assumed  a  distinct  lending  sector  that  lends  to  a  distinct 
borrowing sector. In reality, however, most financial institutions are lenders and borrowers at the 
same  time.  Modern  financial  architecture  consists  of  an  interwoven  network  of  financial 
obligations.
10  In this section, we show how an increase in counterparty credit   risk can create 
additional funding needs and potential systemic risk. 
Network risk is best illustrated by an example related to the Bear Stearns crisis in March 
2008. Imagine a hedge fund that has an interest rate swap agreement with Goldman Sachs—that is, 
both parties had agreed to swap the difference between a floating interest rate and a fixed interest 
rate.  Now  suppose  that  the  hedge  fund  offsets  its  obligation  through  another  swap  with  Bear 
Stearns. In the absence of counterparty credit risk, the two swap agreements can be viewed as 
reduced to a single one between Goldman and Bear Stearns. However, it would be unwise for 
                                                 
10  One  piece  of  evidence  is  that  the  number  of  outstanding  derivatives  contracts  vastly  exceeds  the  number  of 
underlying securities. For example, the notional amount of credit default swap contracts totaled between $45 and $62 
trillion in 2007, while the value of the underlying corporate bond market was only $5 trillion. The discrepancy arises 
because  many  of  the  outstanding  obligations  between  financial  institutions  would  be  netted  out  in  multilateral 
agreements.  
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Goldman to renew the contract if it fears that Bear might default on its commitment. As noted 
earlier, Goldman was asked to increase its direct exposure to Bear after the trading hours on March 
11, 2008. Goldman‘s responsible manager did renew the contract in the morning of March 12, but 
what looked like a delay in response was mistakenly interpreted as a hesitation on Goldman‘s behalf 
and thus as a sign that Goldman was afraid Bear Stearns might be in trouble. This misinterpretation 
was leaked to the media and might have contributed to the run on Bear Stearns. 
 
Figure 5: A network of interest rate swap arrangements 
 
Note: Theoretically, all positions could be fully netted out in a multilateral netting agreement. However, in 
over-the-counter markets each party only knows its own contractual obligations and fear of counterparty 
credit risk might prevent netting.  
 
  Let us extend this example to see how an increase in perceived counterparty credit risk can 
be self-fulfilling and create additional funding needs. Suppose that Bear Stearns had an offsetting   29 
swap agreement with a private equity fund, which in turn offset its exposure with Goldman Sachs.
11 
In  this  hypothetical  example, illustrated in Figure  6, all parties are fully hedged and, hence, a  
multilateral netting arrangement could eliminate all exposures.  However, because all parties are 
aware only of their own contractual agreements, they may not know the full situation and therefore 
become concerned about counterparty credit risk.  If the investment banks refuse to let the hedge 
fund and private equity fund net, i.e. cancel out, their offsetting positions, both funds have to either 
put up additional liquidity, or insure each other against counterparty credit risk by buying credit 
default swaps. This happened in the week after Lehman‘s bankruptcy, September 15-19, 2008. All 
major investment banks were worried that their counterparties might default and they all bought 
credit default swap protection against each other. The already high prices on credit default swaps of 
the major investment banks almost doubled. The price of credit default swaps for AIG was hit the 
worst; it more than doubled within two trading days. 
  Network and counterparty credit risk problems are more easily overcome if a clearinghouse 
or another central authority or regulator knows who owes what to whom. Then, multilateral netting 
agreements, such as the service provided by SwapClear, can stabilize the system. However, the 
introduction of structured products that are typically traded over the counter has made the web of 




An increase in mortgage delinquencies due to a nationwide decline in housing prices was the 
trigger for a full-blown liquidity crisis that emerged in 2007 and might well drag on over the next 
few years. While each crisis has its own specificities, the current one has been surprisingly close to 
a ―classical banking crisis.‖ What is new about this crisis is the extent of securitization, which led to 
an opaque web of interconnected obligations. This paper outlined several amplification mechanisms 
that help explain the causes of the financial turmoil. These mechanisms also form a natural point 
from which to start thinking about a new financial architecture. For example, fire-sale externalities 
and network effects suggest that financial institutions have an individual incentive to take on too 
                                                 
11 A number of other papers consider network effects in financial markets. For example, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) 
shows  that  there  exists  a  (unique)  clearing  payment  vector  that  clears  the  obligations  in  a  setting  with  complete 
information. Allen and Gale (2000) consider a simple network in a banking model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  
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much  leverage,  to  have  excessive  mismatch  in  asset-liability  maturities,  and  to  be  too 
interconnected.  In  Brunnermeier  (2008b),  I  discuss  the  possible  direction  of  future  financial 
regulation using measures of risk that take these domino effects into account. 
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